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PROPTER HONORIS RESPECTUM

KNOWING THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTSt
Mary Ann Glendon*
Interviewer: Finally, Mrs. Roosevelt, is there any way that students can
help to make the Declaration of Human Rights a living document?
Roosevelt: Well, I really think the area in which students shouldfunction is
first of all they should know the Declarationwhich we agreed that we would
strive to implement in our own country.1

The United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948 is the single most important reference point for cross-cultural
discussion of human freedom and dignity in the world today. As described in a leading text, "It is the parent document, the initial burst
of enthusiasm and idealism, terser, more general and grander than
the treaties, in some sense the constitution of the entire movementthe single most invoked human rights instrument."2 As it reaches its
fiftieth anniversary, the Declaration is already showing signs of having
achieved the status of holy writ within the human rights movement.
Public figures nod briefly in its direction when the occasion arises.
Cults have formed around selected provisions. It is widely admired,
but little read. The Declaration as a whole is scarcely known.
The loss of, or, more precisely, the failure to acquire a sense of
the Declaration as an integral body of principles has facilitated a host
of opportunistic interpretations and uses. The prevailing approach to
the rights contained in its thirty articles is a pick-and-choose cafeteriastyle. The sections devoted to traditional political and civil liberties
t
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are frequently, but unevenly, invoked. 3 The provisions on social and
economic justice are commonly ignored, even by major human rights
organizations. 4 The family protection principles have come under direct assault.5 Though virtually all U.N. members are committed in
principle to the proposition that the Declaration's rights are universal,6 some international actors openly maintain that all rights are relative, 7 others assert the priority of economic interests over human
rights,8 and still others charge that universality is a cover for Western
imperialism. 9 The efforts of special interest groups to impose their
agendas in the form of rights lend credibility to fears of cultural
imperialism. 10
In its fiftieth year, the universal rights project can evoke, even in
the minds of its friends, disquieting thoughts of another ambitious
human undertaking: the ill-fated tower built by the men of the Valley
of Shinar who wanted their very own staircase to heaven." Were philosophical rights skeptics, such as Michel Villey and Alasdair
MacIntyre, right, after all, that something is intrinsically wrong with
the universal rights idea? Villey, noting the tensions among several
basic rights (e.g. liberty and equality), argued that the whole idea is
hopelessly incoherent: "Each of the so-called human rights is the
3 Aryeh Neier observes that "the main impact [of human rights] today comes in
curbing abuses by governments that lack geopolitical or economic significance.
When human rights abuses occur in countries of first-rank importance, governments
and intergovernmental bodies that could have influence pay lip service-at best to
the problem." Aryeh Neier, The New Double Standard,FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1996-97,
at 91.
4 See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 269; Lynn Freedman, Reflections on
Emerging Frameworks of Health and Human Rights, 1 HEALTH AND HUM. RTs. 314, 329
(1994).
5 See Mary Ann Glendon, What Happened at Beijing, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 1996, at
30, 32.
6 The Vienna Declaration adopted in 1993 at the Second World Conference on
Human Rights provides in section 1 (5) that "[a] 11human rights are universal, indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated."
7 For example, China's Premier WeiJiang told President Clinton that "concepts
on democracy, on human rights, and on freedoms are relative." John F. Harris, U.S.China Summit on a Tightrope, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 31, 1997, at 1.
8 See Seth Mydans, Do Rights Come First? Asia andEurope Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1996, at A8; Steven Myers, Business Interests Overshadow Human Rights, Survey Results,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, at A8.
9 See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE MAKING OF
WORLD ORDER 38, 195 (1996).
10 For a developing world perspective, see Amartya Sen, Population:Delusion and
Reality, N.Y. REv. oF BooKs, Sept. 22, 1994, at 62.
11 Genesis 11:1-9.
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negation of other rights.' 2 Maclntyre warned that to combine fragments of different conceptual schemes, resting upon incommensurable moral premises, is a recipe for mischief.'3 Belief in human
lights, he scoffed, "is one with belief in witches and unicorns."'14 Garden variety cynics regard the 1948 Declaration as just a hodge-podge
of ideas that emerged from deals cut after World War II, with no more
coherence than a typical federal statute.
With all the turmoil that surrounds the human rights enterprise,
it is natural to wonder whether the design of the Declaration was
faulty and the aims of its framers unrealistic. My own current research
on the origins of the Declaration, however, has led me to increased
admiration for the project of 1948, and for the men and women who
dedicated themselves to it. I am struck by the prescience with which
the framers anticipated the problems that might arise, and impressed
by the safeguards they devised to help minimize future difficulties. I
am moved by the vision of the men and women who, after two world
wars which gave them every reason to despair about the human condition, did what they could to help make the world a better and safer
place. This essay aims to pay tribute to that version by taking seriously
Mrs. Roosevelt's admonition to "know" the Declaration.
I.

WHAT THE PHILOSOPHERS KNEW

The problem of universality loomed large from the moment the
idea of an "international bill of rights" was conceived in the aftermath
of World War II. Was it really possible for the fledging United Nations
to produce a document acceptable to delegates from fifty-eight countries containing four-fifths of the world's population (twenty-one from
the Americas, sixteen from Europe, fourteen from Asia, four from Africa, and three from Oceania)? Six member nations were within the
emerging socialist bloc; in eleven, Islamic culture was strong; four
countries had a large Buddhist population; and thirty-seven were
more or less marked byJudeo-Christian traditions and enlightenment
thought. It was by no means certain that a universal declaration of
rights was feasible.
In 1946, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) appointed a committee composed of many
of the leading thinkers of the day to search for areas of potential
agreement among different cultural and philosophical traditions.
This blue-ribbon "Committee on the Theoretical Bases of Human
12

MICHEL ViLEY, LE DROIT ET LES DROITS DE L'HOMME 12-13 (1983).

13
14

See ALASDAIR MAcINT'RE, AFTER VIRTUE 1-21 (1981)."
Id. at 67.
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Rights" was chaired by Cambridge historian E.H. Carr. University of
Chicago philosopher Richard McKeon was the Rapporteur, and Jacques Maritain was one of the most active members. They began by
sending an elaborate questionnaire to statesman and scholars in every
part of the world. 15 Replies were received reflecting on human rights
from Chinese, Islamic, Hindu, and customary law perspectives, as well
as from the United States, Europe, and the countries of the socialist
bloc. The respondents included such notables as Mahatma Gandhi,
Benedetto Croce, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and Aldous Huxley.
To the Committee's surprise, the lists of basic rights and values they
16
Mcreceived from their far-flung sources were essentially similar.
Keon's final report recorded their conclusion that it was indeed possible to achieve agreement across cultures concerning certain rights
that "may be viewed as implicit in man's nature as an individual and as
17
a member of society.
The Committee members well understood how thin that sort of
agreement was. Maritain liked to tell the story of how a visitor to one
meeting had expressed astonishment that champions of violently opposed ideologies had agreed on a list of fundamental rights. The man
was told, 'Yes, we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks
us why."18 Maritain and his colleagues did not regard this lack of consensus on foundations as fatal. The fact that an agreement could be
achieved across cultures on several practical concepts was "enough,"
Maritain wrote, "to enable a great task to be undertaken."1 9 Such an
agreement, McKeon stressed, would at least provide a "framework
within which divergent philosophical, religious, and even economic,
20
social and political theories might be entertained and developed."
More serious than divergence on the "why" of each right, the philosophers realized, would be the problems of arriving at a common
understanding of what the principles meant, of reconciling tensions
among the various rights, of integrating new rights, and of incorporating new applications. In that connection, Maritain observed that the
document should ideally "cover the scale of values, the key in which,
15 The Committee's report, the questionnaire, and several of the responses are
collected with an introduction by Jacques Maritain in HuMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND
INTERPRETATIONS (UNESCO ed., 1949).
16 Jacques Maritain, Introduction, in HuMAN RGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 10 (UNESCO ed., 1949).
17 Richard McKeon, The PhilosophicBases and Material Circumstances of the Rights of
Man, in HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 16, at 45.
18 Maritain, supra note 16, at 9.
19 Id. at 10.
20 McKeon, supra note 17, at 35.
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in their practical exercise in social life, the acknowledged rights of
man must be hannonized."2 1 Everything depends, he continued, on
"the ultimate value whereon those rights depend and in terms of
22
which they are integrated by mutual limitations."
McKeon foresaw another problem. Different understandings of
the meanings of rights usually reflect divergent concepts of man and
of society, which in turn cause the persons who hold those understandings to have different views of reality. Thus, he predicted that
"difficulties will be discovered in the suspicions, suggested by these
differences, concerning the tangential uses that might be made of a
declaration of human rights for the purpose of advancing special interests." 23 That is a philosopher's way of saying, "Watch out, this
whole enterprise could be hijacked."
II.

WHAT THE

AMERS DID

While the UNESCO Committee was winding up its investigation
of the theoretical bases for human rights, the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, headed by Eleanor Roosevelt, was preparing to draft
an international bill or declaration. The task that faced the Commission was daunting. Proposals, models, and ideas had poured in from
all over the world.24 How could they ever be analyzed, evaluated, and
integrated into a document that the then fifty-eight member nations
of the U.N. would find acceptable?
The Commission was set up with eighteen members, with five
seats allocated to the representatives of the "great powers"-China,
France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The remaining thirteen seats were assigned on a rotating basis to different countries, so that, according to Roosevelt, "there should be due
regard to distribution throughout the world, so that... there would
'25
be no part of the world whose interests would not be considered.
The group's very size and scope, however, could easily have led to
21
22

Maritain, supra note 16, at 15-16.
Id

23

McKeon, supra note 17, at 35.

24 Among the most important preparatory materials were an analysis of all existing treatments of human rights at the national level and the draft proposal that
became the 1948 Pan-American Declaration of Human Rights and Duties (the socalled Bogota Declaration) sponsored by the regional organization that later became

the Organization of American States. The analytical survey was prepared by a Canadian,John P. Humphrey, the permanent head of the Division of Human Rights in the

U.N. Secretariat. Cassin acknowledged a debt to Humphrey's "excellent work" in
REN9 CAssrN, LA PENSfE ET L'AcTION 108 (1972).
25 ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 315 (1961).
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grave difficulties. The framers might well have ended up like the architects in Pieter Brueghel the Elder's rendition of the Tower of Babel, poring despondently over their plans in the shadow of a crazy pile
constructed by a consortium, each of whose members had a somewhat
different conception of what the whole should look like.
The work in fact got off to a rocky start when the leadership of
the Commission (Mrs. Roosevelt, President; China's Peng-Chun
Chang, Vice-President; and Lebanon's Charles Malik, Rapporteur) appointed itself as the drafting subcommittee. After several delegates
protested that the group was insufficiently representative, the membership was expanded to eight by adding the delegates from Australia,
Chile, England, France, and the Soviet Union. 26 Happily for the Universal Declaration, this potentially unwieldy assemblage appointed a
four-person "working" group. That smaller group, composed of the
American, English, French, and Lebanese members, in turn chose to
put a single author in charge of the actual drafting process.
The lot fell to one of the most distinguished jurists of the twentieth century. Ren6 Cassin had been General Charles de Gaulle's principal legal adviser during World War II, and was entrusted by de
Gaulle at war's end with the formidable task of rehabilitating the compromised French administrative system. 27 So far as the Declaration
was concerned, it was fortuitous that Cassin was a pioneer of the study
of comparative law. 28 He was also experienced in the art of legislative
drafting, having drawn up the instruments constituting the govern29
ment of the Free French during the war.

26

See

PHILIPPE DE LA CHAPELLE, LA DECLARATION UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE

L'HOMME ET LE CATHOLICISME

27

34 (1967).

The principal biographies are MARC AcI, RENt CASSIN: FANTASSIN DES DROITS
(1979); and GERARD ISRAEL, RENE CASSIN (1990). Among the many key
positions held by Cassin after the war were the presidency of the Conseil d'Etat, the
presidency of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, the presidency of the European
Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg, and membership on the French Constitutional
Council.
28 In his memoirs, Cassin observed: "The study of comparative law is always useful. But when one seeks ...as in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights to identify a
certain number of common principles concerning the fundamental rights of every
human being, comparative law becomes a necessity." CASSIN, supra note 24, at 224.
29 See ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 181. Cassin later recalled his uneasiness when he
found, at the first meeting of the Commission, that many of the eighteen delegates
had no legal training whatsoever. Cassin, supra note 24, at 105. For a discussion of
the continental advantage in legislative drafting, see Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 95,
95-114 (1997).
DE L'HOMME
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Cassin's background in a civil law system where drafting skills are
highly prized facilitated a response to Maritain's call for a document
with a hermeneutical "key." The Preamble and the Proclamation, as
well as Articles I and 2 of the thirty-article Declaration, belong to what
in continental legal terminology is called the "general part." These
sections set forth premises, purposes, and principles that guide the
interpretation of the specifically enumerated rights in Articles 3 to 27.
The Declaration's last three articles, again, contain interpretive
guides, contextualizing rights in relation to limits, duties, and the social and political order in which they are to be realized.
When the Declaration emerged from the drafting committee, it
was recognizably "civilian" in form and style. Since the civil law tradition then, as now, was the most widely distributed legal tradition in
the world,30 that meant the draft had a familial resemblance, not only
to rights declarations in continental European constitutions, but to
the constitutions and charters that had appeared or were soon to appear in many Latin American, African, and Asian countries.
The draft was submitted to all U.N. member governments for
comments and to the full Human Rights Commission for debate. In
the process, it went through several revisions. There was no nation,
according to Cassin, that did not "usefully contribute to the improvement of the draft through suggestions or criticisms."'3 ' The fact that
representatives from many countries had contributed to its content,
plus the broad process of consultation that preceded and accompanied the drafting stage, helped to ease the way for its ultimate adoption by the General Assembly.
Behind the scenes work by Roosevelt must have contributed toward that end as well. Early on, she initiated informal meetings
among women delegates and found the custom so fruitful that she
broadened it. She began getting together with U.N. representatives of
different nationalities on a semi-social basis. Malik and Chang, the
most scholarly members of her Commission, got to know each other
better while bantering about Thomism and Confucianism over tea in
Roosevelt's apartment. 32 "I discovered," she wrote in her autobiography, "that in such informal sessions we sometimes made more progress in reaching an understanding on some question before the
United Nations than we had been able to achieve in the formal work
30

See

MARY
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1994).
31 CASSIN, supra note 24, at 112-13.

32 See ROOSEVELT, supra note 25, at 317.
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of our committees."3 3 One group, however, remained resolutely aloof
from her efforts. "[I] t was difficult to know any Russian well and I
suppose the Kremlin planned it that way. It was really impossible to
'3 4
have a private and frank talk with Russian officials.
At the next stage, in July 1948, Cassin and Roosevelt were heartened when the Economic and Social Commission (chaired by Malik)
unanimously approved the "final" draft submitted to it by the Human
Rights Commission.3 5 That removed the last hurdle before submission to the General Assembly. But when the General Assembly began
its deliberations on the Declaration in September 1948, the international scene was extremely tense. Relations were worsening between
the Soviet Union and the West. The Berlin blockade was a powder
keg waiting for a match. Conflict had broken out in Greece and Korea. Small nations were becoming resentful of the influence of the
great powers and suspicious of their motives. Cynicism and power
politics had taken their toll on the mood of hopefulness in which the
human rights project had been launched. A decade later, Roosevelt
told an interviewer, "We thought we were presenting such a good
draft that there would be very little discussion. We found we were
mistaken. In the big committee they argued every word ....
And so
'3 6
we had some terrible times in Paris.
It took the talents of another extraordinary individual to shepherd the Declaration through the process of deliberation and revision
that led up to final adoption in December 1948. That man was Malik,
a personable Lebanese philosophy professor whose diplomatic skills
were as finely honed as Cassin's legal talents. 37 Malik was a familiar
figure on the little gray TV screens of the 1950s. Well-respected
among delegates from many different parts of the world, he was frequently elected to leadership positions in the U.N., including mem33

ROOSEVELT,

34

Id. at 311.

supra note 25, at 305.

35

See CASSIN, supra note 24, at 112; see also

ROOSEVELT,

supra note 25, at 320.

36 LANCER, supra note 1.
37 For biographical information, see Charles Habib Malik, in CURRENT BIOGRAPHY
410 (Anna Rothe ed., 1948). Though a prominent figure on the international scene
throughout the 1950s, Malik always described himself as primarily a philosopher and
theologian. He earned his Ph.D. at Harvard University, and taught at Harvard, Beirut
University, and Catholic University. Jude P. Dougherty, Charles Habib Malik, in YEARBOOK-1989 237 (American Philosophical Society ed., 1990). A Greek Orthodox Chris-

tian, Malik frequently defended Arab and Palestinian views in the U.N. in the early
1950s, but later found himself at odds with Arab leaders on various issues. The 1987
Reuter obituary cryptically reports, "None of Lebanon's Moslem or pro-Syrian politicians or militia leaders mourned Malik's death." Lebanon's ChristiansMourn Veteran
Diplomat Charles Malik, REUTER

LIBR. REP.,

Dec. 29, 1987.
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bership on the Security Council and the Presidency of the General
Assembly.3 8 During the period leading up to the adoption of the Declaration, he wore many hats, serving as the Human Rights Commission's Rapporteur, an active member of the four-person working
group on the draft, and President of the Economic and Social Council
to which the Commission reported. When the draft Declaration was
ready to be taken to the General Assembly, it was the ubiquitous Malik
who chaired the three-person group that steered it through more
than eighty stormy meetings in Paris in the fall of 1948.
Malik's fluency in many languages, including Arabic, French,
German, and English, enabled him to move easily between East and
West, and between large and small nations. He made the most of the
fact that the document reflected input from diverse sources, and he
took pains to point each country to the places in the Declaration
where it could either find its own contributions, or the influence of
the culture to which it belonged. 39 At many stages, he was aided by
Mrs. Roosevelt, who was a shaper as well as a wielder of the influence
40
of the United States.
The Soviet Union, represented by the intelligent and voluble Professor A.P. Pavlov, made repeated efforts to stall and drag out the process. "[Pavlov] was an orator of great power," Roosevelt recalled, "his
words rolled out of his black beard like a river, and stopping him was
difficult."'41 With each delay, the prospects for success grew dimmer,
to the point where Cassin began to fear that all his work might go for
naught. 42 But Malik was up to the challenge. Durward Sandifer,
Roosevelt's State Department adviser, described Malik as "the only
person I ever knew who succeeded in holding a stopwatch to
43
Pavlov."
Malik directed his arguments to the public and posterity as well as
to his fellow delegates. Unlike previous rights declarations which had
sprung from particular cultures, he said, the Universal Declaration
was "a composite synthesis of all these outlooks and movements and of
38

See Former Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik Dies, REUTER LIB. REP., Dec. 29, 1987.

39

See Charles Malik, The Challenge of Human Rights, in BEHIND THE HEA LINES,

Dec. 1949, at 2.
40 For an account of Roosevelt's subtle but influential role, see JOSEPH P. LASH,
ELEANOR: THE YEARS ALONE 56-81 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1972). Cassin remembered
her as "apolitical woman who was sensitive to opinion, and who showed remarkable
skill in dealing with Indian and Lebanese philosophers, American statesmen and diplomats, as well as delegates from old Europe and the Eastern world." GAssnN, supra
note 24, at 82.
41 ROOSzEELT, supra note 25, at 320.
42 See AGi, supra note 27, at 231.
43 LASH, supra note 40, at 78.
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much Oriental and Latin American wisdom. Such a synthesis has
never occurred before in history."44 The Latin American countries
had brought to the process the ideas and experience gained in preparing the 1948 Pan-American Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of Man; India had played a key role in advancing the non-discrimination principle, especially with respect to women; the United Kingdom
and the United States had shared the wisdom acquired in their long
experience with traditional political and civil liberties; the Soviet
Union had championed the cause of improving the living conditions
of the broad mass of people; the importance of including duties had
been emphasized by participants from China, Latin America, the Soviet Union, and France; many smaller countries contributed to the
articles on freedom of religion and the rights of the family; the social,
economic, and cultural rights had numerous fathers and mothers. 4 5
The debates wore on for two months, often lasting late into the
night. 46 Finally, on December 10, 1948, in spite of the deteriorating
international situation, the Declaration was approved without a single
dissenting vote. Malik and Roosevelt received a standing ovation. 47
Clouds loomed on the horizon, however. Eight countries, including
the entire socialist bloc, abstained: Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and
48
Yugoslavia.
Today, when one reads what Cassin, Malik, Maritain, McKeon,
Roosevelt, and their colleagues said and wrote many years ago, it is
striking that they foresaw nearly every problem their enterprise would
encounter-its buffeting from power politics, its dependence on common understandings that would prove elusive, its embodiment of
ideas of freedom and solidarity that would be difficult to harmonize,
and its vulnerability to politicization and misunderstanding. It is of
interest, therefore, to see how they attempted to protect it against the
most egregious forms of manipulation.
III.

KNOWING THE DECLARATION

49

The Universal Declaration, with its thirty short articles, seems at
first glance to invite comparison with older rights documents such as
44
45
46
47
48

Malik, supra note 39, at 1; see also CASSIN, supra note 24, at 233.
See Malik, supra note 39, at 1-3.
See ROOSEVELT, supra note 25, at 320.
See Charles Habib Malik, supra note 37, at 412.
See Charles Malik, Human Rights in the United Nations,U.N. BULL., Sept. 1952, at

49 For the reader's convenience, the Universal Declaration appears as an
Appendix infra at 1177.
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the Magna Carta, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
the Citizen, and the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In
recent years, American influence upon the international human
rights movement has become so pervasive that the Declaration is now
widely read as Americans read the Bill of Rights: as a string of essentially separate guarantees. As we shall see, however, that approach is
inappropriate for an organic document like the Declaration. 50 The
Declaration is not a list or a "bill," but a set of principles that are
related to one another and to certain over-arching ideas. It possesses
an integrity which has considerable strength when the document is
read as it was meant to be read, namely as a whole.
Cassin often compared the Declaration to the portico of a temple. 51 (He had no illusions that the document could be anything
more than an entryway to a future where human rights would be
respected.) He saw the Preamble, with its eight "whereas" clauses, as
the courtyard steps moving by degrees from the recognition of human
dignity to the unity of the human family to the aspiration for peace on
earth. The general principles of dignity, liberty, equality, and fraternity, proclaimed in Articles 1 and 2, are the portico's foundation
blocks. The facade consists of four equal columns crowned by a pediment. The four pillars are: the personal liberties (Articles 3 through
11); the rights of the individual in relation to others and to various
groups (Articles 12 through 17); the spiritual, public, and political liberties (Articles 18 through 21); and the economic, social, and cultural
rights (Articles 22 through 27). The pediment is composed of the
three concluding articles, 28 through 30, which establish a range of
connections between the the individual and society.
Let us stroll through the portico, noting the relations among its
parts, and some of the more interesting architectural details.
The Preamble begins by asserting the dependence of freedom,
justice, and peace upon the universal recognition of human dignity
and rights. It announces the principal innovation of the Declaration:
that human rights are universal, belonging to "all members of the
human family." In other words, it repudiates the long-standing view
that the relation between a sovereign state and its own citizens is that
nation's own business.
The Preamble then evokes the circumstances that give rise to the
need for universal standards: "[D]isregard and contempt for human
50

For a convincing argument that the clause-by-clause approach is also inappro-

priate for the Bill of Rights, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,

100 YALE. L.J. 1131 (1991).
51

See AGI, supra note 27, at 317.
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rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind." It goes on to speak of hopes for a better world
where human beings may enjoy what most U.S. readers of the day
would have recognized as Franklin Roosevelt's four freedoms: "free52
dom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want." It
points toward a future when rights will be "protected by the rule of
law" and by "the development of friendly relations among nations."
The Preamble then anchors the Declaration firmly in the U.N.
Charter:
Whereas the people of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and
women and have determined to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom ....
By expressly including women, by alluding to freedom from want,
and by evoking the U.N. Charter's commitment to better standards of
life, the Preamble signals from the outset that this document is not
just a "universalization" of the traditional eighteenth century "rights
of man," but part of a new "moment" in the history of human rights.
In this respect, the Universal Declaration belongs to the family of postWorld War II rights instruments that attempted to graft social justice
onto the trunk of the tree of liberty. Most of these instruments also
bear traces of roots in a past before the first rights moment. In the
Declaration, for example, human dignity is said to be "inherent"; dignity and rights are "recognized," not conferred; human beings are
said to be "born" free and equal, and "endowed" with reason and conscience; the family is "natural" as well as fundamental. Hence
MacIntyre's warning about incommensurable moral premises. The
framers hoped, however, that the graft, the tree, and the roots would
nourish one another.
The Preamble is followed by a Proclamation clause which announces the nature of the document.5 3 The Declaration is to be "a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations" toward
which "every individual and every organ of society" should "strive"
52

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State of the Union Message (Jan. 6, 1941), in 1940
D. ROOSEVELT 663 (1941).
53 One of the first decisions made by the Commission on Human Rights was that
the "international bill of rights" it had been asked to prepare should be in the form of
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN

a declaration rather than a legally binding treaty or covenant. The international
human rights system that grew up subsequently includes many treaties and convenants, including the two 1966 covenants that were adopted to implement the Universal Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

19981

UNIVERSAL

DECLARATION

OF HUMAN

RIGHTS

1165

(and by which the conduct of nations and peoples can be measured).
The Proclamation implicitly acknowledges the hurdles ahead, stating
that "a common understanding" of the Declaration's rights and freedoms "is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this
pledge."
The Declaration proper then begins, not with a right, but in civil
law fashion, with two introductory general articles. It was at Cassin's
insistence that a declaration purporting to be universal should begin
with a statement of what all human beings have in common. 5 4 Thus
the first article reads: "All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." It speaks
volumes about the spirit of Cassin, a World War I veteran of Jewish
ancestry who had lost twenty-one relatives in concentration camps, 55

that he insisted on beginning the Declaration with an affirmation of
faith in human conscience and rationality. In 1968, that largeness of
spirit was recognized when he received the Nobel Peace Prize for his
years of work on behalf of human rights.
Article 2's emphatic statement of the anti-discrimination principle underlines the principle of universality. "Everyone" in the Declaration means everyone-"without distinction of any kind."
The Declaration then turns, in Articles 3 to 11,56 to familiar individual rights that had already received a significant degree of recognition, if not implementation, in various legal systems: rights to life,
liberty, and personal security; bans on slavery and torture; rights to
legal recognition, equality before the law, effective remedies for violation of fundamental rights, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; and guarantees of fair criminal procedures, presumption of
innocence, and the principle of non-retroactivity in criminal law.
In Cassin's view, the rights in this first group were mainly directed
toward protecting individuals as such from aggression, while the rights
in Articles 12 to 17 were more concerned with protecting people in
their relations with others and within civil society. 57 His second column includes the right to be free of arbitrary interference with one's
"privacy, family, home, or correspondence" and from arbitrary attacks
upon one's "honor and reputation"; freedom of movement and the
right of return; the right to political asylum; the right to a nationality;
See DE LA CHAPEIt, supra note 26, at 83.
55 See CASSIN, supra note 24, at 213.
56 Here, I follow Cassin's quadripartite division of the body of the Declaration,
although it seems to me that other groupings are plausible as well.
57 See AGI, supra note 27, at 326.
54
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provisions on marriage and the family; and the right to own property.
This second group of rights is less precisely formulated than the first,
leaving larger scope for variation in different social and political
contexts.
Article 16, dealing with marriage and the family, is a blend of old
and new ideas with varying genealogies. It went far beyond most national legislation of the day with its affirmation of the principle of
equal rights between spouses. The idea that the family "is entitled to
protection by society and the State," on the other hand, was familiar
in many countries as legislative policy, had already appeared in several
58
constitutions, and would shortly appear in many others.
Cassin's third pillar, Articles 18 through 21, covers freedoms of
religion and belief in Article 18; opinion, expression, and communication in Article 19; assembly and association in Article 20; and the principle of participatory democratic government in Article 21. Article 18
is noteworthy for its fairly detailed specification of the content of religious freedom. The Human Rights Commission had been on the
verge of going forward with a draft that spoke only of conscience and
belief, but when Roosevelt interjected that a text protecting religious
freedom ought to use the word "religion," that view carried the day. 59
In its final form, Article 18 not only protects religious freedom expressly, but acknowledges the right to manifest one's beliefs in public
as well as in private, and "in community with others" (this latter point
due to an amendment by Malik to Cassin's more individualistic rendering of the concept).60
Apart from the aspiration to universality, the most innovative part
of the Declaration was its fourth pillar, Articles 22 through 27, which
elevates to fundamental right status several "new" economic, social,
and cultural rights. As memories fade, it is sometimes assumed that
this collection of rights was included mainly as a concession to the
Soviets. The fact is, however, that support for these ideas was very
broad-based.
The Declaration's social and economic rights provisions drew
from a variety of sources. They contained more than an echo of
FDR's proposed "second bill of rights, 6 1 a legacy which Mrs.
58 The Preamble to the 1946 French Constitution stated, "The nation ensures to
the individual and the family the conditions necessary to their development," CONsr.
preamble. Germany's Basic Law of 1949 provided, "Marriage and family shall enjoy
the special protection of the state," GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 6, 1.
59 See DE LA CHAPELLE, supra note 26, at 150.
60 See id. at 151.
61 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State of the Union Message (Jan. 11, 1944), in
1944-45

THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN

D. RoosEvELT 32 (1950).
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Roosevelt "through her very name," according to Malik, "imported
into our council chambers. '62 (Officials in the Truman State Department were initially "lukewarm" toward the idea of social and eco63
nomic rights, but Mrs. Roosevelt eventually won their backing.)
This group of rights also bore a close resemblance to their counterparts in the Preamble of the 1946 French Constitution, the 1948 Bogota Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, as well as to the
programs of socialist and many Christian political parties. Similar
rights would soon appear in most postwar and post-colonial constitutions, sometimes framed as obligations of society and the state. At the
international level, similar principles had been recognized by the In64
ternational Labor Organization.
Much of what is contained in Articles 23 and 24 was already the
common stuff of labor legislation in most liberal democracies (decent
working conditions including paid vacations and limits on working
hours; protection against unemployment; the right to form and join
unions). Less widely recognized, however, were Article 23's "right to
work" and its "right to equal pay for equal work" without discrimination; Article 25's elevation of social welfare principles into a universal
right to a decent standard of living; and Article 26's right to
education.
Agreement on the relation of the "new" rights to the "old" was
much harder to achieve than agreement on their content. 65 According to Cassin, the sessions where the Commission wrestled with that
problem were extremely difficult and emotionally charged. 6 6 England
wanted the differences from traditional civil and political liberties to
be sharply emphasized. It took the position that the social and eco67
nomic rights should be handled in an entirely separate document.
The Soviet Union, for its part, opposed any measure which would ap68
pear to relegate social and economic rights to an inferior rank.
Madame Mehta, the Indian representative, pointed out that poorer
nations could hope to move only gradually toward making such rights
69
a reality.
62 Charles Habib Malik, Introduction, in 0. FREDERICK
HuMAN RIGHTS IN ECUMENICAL PERSPECTIVE 7, 9 (1968).
63 See LASH, supra note 40, at 62.
64 See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 257-58.
65 See CASSIN, supra note 24, at 110.
66 See id. at 110-11.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See ROOSEVELT, supra note 25, at 318.

NOLDE, FREE AND EQUAL:

1 168

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 73:5

Cassin finally resolved the impasse by drafting a "chapeau" or
"umbrella" provision, Article 22, which serves as a mini-preamble to
the provisions dealing with social, economic, and cultural rights. The
chapeau tried to satisfy the socialist bloc by making clear that the new
rights, like the old, are "indispensable" to human dignity.7 0 It responded to the English and Indian concerns by recognizing that the
new rights stood on a different footing from the old so far as implementation was concerned. Unlike traditional civil rights, which are
protected mainly through access to courts, and political rights, which
are secured mainly through constitutional frameworks, the economic
and social rights require more official planning for their realization,
and are more dependent on each country's economic situation. Accordingly, Article 22 specifies that the economic and social rights are
to be realized "in accordance with the organisation and resources of
each State." It was Mrs. Roosevelt who, in a particularly heated session, came up with the words just quoted that finally permitted agree7
ment to be achieved. '
It is a credit to Cassin's skill that the "new" rights were not simply
tacked onto, but integrated with, the more traditional rights that preceded them. Article 22 links the social, economic, and cultural rights
to the protection of the individual in such a way that each group of
rights sheds interpretive light on the other. The "new" rights are
presented as rights of the individual, "indispensable for his dignity
and the free development of his personality." The last sentence of
Article 26 on parents' rights provides a bridge between the new right
to education and the older family protection idea of Article 16. Similarly, Article 27, while recognizing a new "right to participate in the
cultural life of the community," looks back to Article 17's property
rights through its reference to protecting scientific inventions and literary and artistic creations.
The last three sections of the Declaration, in Cassin's view, constituted the pediment of the portico covering the entire Declaration and
making essential links between the individual and society. 72 Like the

Preamble and Articles 1 and 2, these three sections bear importantly
70 Article 22: "Everyone, as a member of society ....
is entitled to the realisation ... in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social, and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free
development of his personality."
71 See CASSIN, supranote 24, at 111. According to one biographer, such inspired
interventions by Roosevelt were frequently prefaced by remarks in which she conceded her interlocutor had a point, and with disclaimers such as "of course, I'm a
woman and don't understand all these things." LASH, supra note 40, at 69.
72 See AGI, supra note 27, at 336.
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on the meaning of the document as a whole. They address certain
conditions that are prerequisite to the realization of the rights and
freedoms enumerated in the Declaration. Once again, a general article serves as a kind of mini-preamble to illuminate what follows. Article 28, the invention of Charles Malik, 7 3 speaks of a right to a certain
kind of order: "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be
fully realised."
Two necessary features of an order where rights can be realized
are then spelled out, but quickly qualified, in Article 29: "Everyone
has duties to the community" (but to a certain kind of community,
where "the free and full development of his personality is possible"),
and everyone's rights are subject to limitations (but only "for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society"). A further limit on rights is the subject of Article 30: "Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or person
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein."
When Cassin described these last three articles as linking the individual and society, he was referring to the way the Declaration handled a problem that had arisen in the drafting process. Where was
primary responsibility for implementing human rights to lie? Even if
an international enforcement machinery were to be created someday,
that could not be the first line of defense. The Soviet representative
had insisted that the sentence, "This shall be enforced by the state,"
be appended to many articles. 74 In the spring of 1948, upon re-reading the draft, the Commission members came to the conclusion that a
misleading impression had been created. Cassin recalled:
It was apparent that its provisions repeatedly referred to the role of
the State, as if that were the permanent and only agency for the
protection and regulation of the rights of man. But man must be
envisaged not only in his relations with the State, but with the social
groups of all sorts to which he belongs: family, tribe, city, profession, confession, and more broadly the global human community.
Amendments were needed in order to remove all ambiguity on this
point.75

73 See CASSIN, supra note 24, at 111.
74 See ROOSEVELT, supra note 25, at 317.
75 GASSIN, supra note 24, at 10; see also Aci, supra note 27, at 230.
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In the view of Cassin and others, it had to be made clear that the
responsibility for protecting human rights belonged not only to the
nation states, but to persons and groups below and above the national
level. The Declaration was thus ahead of its time in recognizing the
importance for human freedom of a wide range of social groups, beginning with families, and extending through the institutions of civil
society, nation states, and international organizations. The Proclamation clause calls not only "all peoples and all nations" but "every organ
of society" to promote recognition and observance of human rights.
In the main body of the Declaration, individuals are protected in their
social as well as political settings. The rights to own property and to
participate in important institutions of civil society-religious groups,
labor organizations, and families-are guaranteed along with the
right to take part in government. The family as such is a subject of
human rights protection, to be provided, significantly, "by society" as
well as the state (Article 16, 3). Article 28's right "to a social and
international order in which the rights and freedoms" of the Declaration can be fully realized is the capstone of this group of provisions.
The Declaration as a whole leaves "no room for doubt," Cassin
said in his Nobel speech, "concerning the essential question whether
the nations have retained or lost their traditional exclusive jurisdiction over the treatment of their citizens. That national jurisdiction
will always be at the base. It will remain primary. But it will no longer
be exclusive.

'76

The principal architects of the Declaration believed that the most
effective defense of human rights would ultimately be "in the mind
and the will of the people.

'7 7

"In the eyes of the Declaration's au-

thors," Cassin wrote, "respect for human rights depends first and foremost on the mentalities of individuals and social groups. ' 78 Roosevelt
mused in a 1958 interview:
Where, after all, do human rights begin? In small places, close to
home-so close and small that they cannot be seen on any maps of
the world .... Unless these rights have meaning there, they have
little meaning anywhere. Without concerned citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the
79
larger world.
In sum, even a cursory reading of the Declaration in its entirety
shows that it is no mere list of rights. In form, as distinct from con76
77
78
79

supra note 24, at 171.
62, at 70.
CASSIN, supra note 24, at 155.
LASH, supra note 40, at 81.
CASSIN,

NOLDE, supra note
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tent, the Declaration is recognizably a product of the drafting tradition that had been brought to its highest degree of refinement in the
code-based continental European legal systems. The new rights instruments emerging from that tradition were patterned on the old
codes in certain respects-their level of generality, the use of general
clauses, the mutually conditioning relations among their parts, and
the aspiration to be enduring. It follows that the Declaration is best
understood through the methods of interpretation that are associated
with that tradition.
The broad elements of those methods can be briefly summarized.
The interpreter begins by reading the text as a whole, becoming
aware of the interpretive guides that are embedded in it. Ordinarily,
the text contains a few general principles that apply to the entire document, supplemented by special principles governing particular sections. Tension or conflict among principles and provisions is
approached with a view toward respecting the priorities established in
the text, and, if possible, optimizing the scope of each principle involved. Each interpretation should support the unity of the text.
Though there is wide consensus in the civil law world on the elements of an approach to interpretation, that does not preclude lively
controversy on specific applications.80 And, in the case of human
rights documents, laden with open-ended general clauses, there is
plenty of room for debate as well as for reasoned elaboration of principle. Anticipating the incoherence critique mounted by Villey and
others, McKeon tried to put the paradoxes of human rights in a positive light. "[They] are not ambiguities resulting from confusion or
contradiction;" he argued, "they are productive ambiguities which embody the knowledge and experience men have acquired in the long
history of rights, and which provide the beginning points for further
advances."8 ' The history of human rights is paradoxical because "it
embodies concretely all the great antitheses and paralogisms explored
by philosophers-the problems of the whole and the part, the universal and the particular, the internal and the external, the apparent and
82

the real."

Accepting McKeon's characterization, what then is to prevent the
interpretation of a document embodying those great tensions from
degenerating into utter chaos? Maritain had stressed the need for
80 See Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation,Schools ofJuprudence,and Anthropology: Some Remarks from a German Point of View, 42 AM. J. COMp. L. 395 (1994).
81 RICHARD MCKEON, FREEDOM AND HISTORY 56 (1968).
82

Id. at 49.
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some "ultimate value whereon those rights depend and in terms of
83
which they are integrated by mutual limitations."
But does the Declaration have such an ultimate value? An obvious candidate is human dignity. Dignity enjoys pride of place in the
Declaration: it is affirmed ahead of rights at the very beginning of the
Preamble; it is accorded priority again in Article 1; and it is woven into
the text at three other key points, connecting the Declaration to the
Charter in the fifth clause of the Preamble, introducing the social and
economic rights in the "chapeau" (Article 22), and in Article 23's reference to "an existence worthy of human dignity."
The drafters fleshed out the dignity concept by connecting it to a
fairly specific image of the human person. Human beings are said to
be "endowed with reason and conscience," and they are expected to
"act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." The Declara-

tion's "everyone" is envisioned as an individual, uniquely valuable in

himself. (There are three separate references to the "free development of his personality.") But "everyone" is also portrayed as situated
in families, communities, workplaces, associations, societies, cultures,
nations, and an emerging international order. In fact, Article 28 tells
us that it is in community "alone" that the "free and full development
of his personality is possible." Though its main body is devoted to
basic freedoms, the Declaration begins and ends with exhortations to
solidarity (Articles 1 and 29). Whatever else may be said of him or
her, the Declaration's "everyone" is not a lone bearer of rights.
It is instructive to consider, in this connection, the approach that

one of the world's most respected constitutional courts has taken to its
own dignitarian rights document, approximately contemporaneous
with the Universal Declaration. The German Basic Law of 1949, prepared under the watchful eyes of the Allied powers, begins by declaring in Article 1: "The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect
and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority." In one of its
earliest-and most frequently cited-decisions, the German Constitutional Court drew from the Basic Law as a whole a picture of the
human person that has informed many subsequent decisions: "The
image of man in the Basic Law is not that of an isolated, sovereign
individual. The Basic Law resolves the tension between individual and
society by relating and binding the individual to society, but without
detracting from the intrinsic value of the person. '8 4 As one commen-

83
84

Maritain, supra note 16, at 16.
The Investment Aid Case, 4 BVerfGE 7 (1954).
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tator puts it, "this implies a departure from classical individualism, but
85
at the same time rejects any form of collectivism.
Politically savvy, philosophically sophisticated creatures that they
were, the Declaration's framers knew that the dignity principle possessed no special immunity to deconstruction, and that no document,
however skillfully crafted, was proof against manipulation. Maritain
said it best: whether the music played on the Declaration's thirty
strings will be "in tune with, or harmful to, human dignity," will depend primarily on the extent to which a "culture of human dignity"
86
develops.
IV. REMEMBERING THE DECLARATION
To the disappointment of the framers, the adoption of the Declaration was followed by nearly two decades during which the international human rights project stalled amidst Cold War politics. 8 7 By
1953, Cassin was complaining bitterly about what he considered to be
the "scandalous politicization" of U.N. agencies, especially
UNESCO."" In his 1968 Nobel acceptance speech, he deplored the
delays which he said had been "very prejudicial" to the preparation of
covenants to implement the Declaration, and he blamed the "desire
of certain powers to delay even modest measures of implementation
8' 9
out of concern for their national sovereignty.
As the Cold War gradually thawed, human rights consciousness
did indeed increase. But when the Declaration woke up, so to speak,
it was like Rip Van Winkle, who emerged from his long slumber to
find himself in a world where no one recognized him. The architects
of the Declaration were mostly departed or inactive, and in their place
was forming a human rights industry, much influenced by the ideas
about rights, both good and bad, that were developed in the American judicial rights revolution. 90 The U.N. itself had grown in size and
ambition; its specialized agencies, employing thousands of international civil servants, were surrounded by, and symbiotically intertwined with, various lobbying groups. The Declaration began to be
85 Kurt Sontheimer, Principlesof Human Dignity in the FederalRepublic, in GERmANY
ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 213, 215 (Paul Kirchof & Donald Kommers eds., 1993).
86 Maritain, supra note 16, at 16.
87 See CAssrIN, supra note 24, at 226.
88 See ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 234.
89 CAssrN, supra note 24, at 170-71.
90 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991) (especially Chapter 6);
Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 CoLum. L. REV. 537
AND

(1988).
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widely, almost universally, read in the way that Americans read the Bill
of Rights, that is, as a string of essentially separate guarantees.
By isolating each part from its place in an overall design, that
now-common misreading of the Declaration promotes misunderstanding and facilitates misuse. The popular cafeteria approach to
the Declaration's rights inevitably means that the devices that were
supposed to support the integrity of the document would be ignored.
A major casualty has been the Declaration's insistence on the links
between freedom and solidarity, just at a time when affluent nations
seem increasingly to be washing their hands of poor countries and
peoples. As for the aspiration to universality, with 185 flags now flying
outside U.N. headquarters, it is natural to wonder whether the idea
can withstand the stresses of mutual suspicion and heightened national and ethnic assertiveness.
None of these problems have simple solutions. National interests
and healthy economies are important, not only in themselves, but
often for the sake of "better standards of living in larger freedom."
The language of the Declaration is ambiguous. Principles such as
freedom and solidarity do sit uneasily with one another. Meanwhile,
in the years since 1948, "barbarous acts that outrage the conscience of
mankind" have recurred with appalling regularity. Universal human
rights remain an elusive dream.
At the present juncture, friends of human rights could do worse
than to recall the framers' understandings of what a Declaration calling itself universal can and cannot accomplish. The men and women
of 1948 were not naive about politics or human nature. To people
who had lived through two world wars, it was evident that "even the
noblest and most solemn declarations could not suffice to restore... faith in human rights."9 1 For the Soviets, that was the end of
the matter. After the final vote in the U.N., Andrei Vishinsky contemptuously dismissed the Universal Declaration as just a "collection
92
of pious phrases."
The Declaration's founding fathers and mothers had a vastly different, but no less realistic, outlook. For them, the elusiveness of the
goal did not mean it was not worth pursuing with all one's might and
main. While not exaggerating the importance of their work, neither
did they underestimate the effects that might radiate from a common
statement of principles. Malik predicted that the international
human rights project would contribute to the formation of a "human
91 Maritain, supra note 16, at 16-17.
92 John Kenton, Human Rights Declaration Adopted by U.N.Assembly, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 11, 1948, at Al.
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rights conscience," and accurately foresaw that it would help to "focus
the eyes of the world on the local scene." The Declaration itself is
permeated with the realism as well as the hopes of the founders. It
recognizes that full implementation requires a common understanding that is still far from being achieved; it recognizes that freedom
depends on certain social, political, and economic conditions; it anticipates and attempts to forestall the most egregious forms of
misintepretation.
So far as the tension between universal rights and particular traditions is concerned, the Declaration's framework is capacious enough
to encompass a degree of pluralism. Philosophers like McKeon and
Maritain did not regard recognition of universal rights and respect for
particular cultures as irreconcilable. After all, rights emerge from culture, cannot be sustained without cultural underpinnings, and, to be
effective, must become part of each people's way of life.
The UNESCO committee theorists did not believe a declaration
of universal principles could, or should, lead to completely uniform
means of expressing and protecting basic rights. Why should there
not be different cultural expressions of the universal human longing
for freedom, and different ways of pondering the eternal tensions between freedom and order, the individual and the group? Ideally, each
rights tradition would be enriched as it put the principles into practice, and the various experiences of the nations would in turn enrich
the understanding of universal rights. With improved communication
and with the accumulation of experiences of successful cross-cultural
cooperation, they hoped, areas of common understanding would expand. 93 But there would always be, as Maritain put it, different kinds
94
of music played on the same keyboard.
That equanimity concerning different visions of freedom proceeded, no doubt, from modesty concerning the state of human
knowledge. "No declaration of human rights will ever be exhaustive
or final," Maritain concluded after pondering the history of rights
ideas. 95 The dynamic character of the relations among rights, the development of new rights, and new applications of old rights, McKeon
96
added, would constantly "enrich their ambiguity."
One philosopher's fertile ambiguity, of course, is another's fatal
flaw. As my own research has progressed, however, I have come to see
93 See McKeon, supra note 81, at 41.
94 See Maritain, supra note 16, at 16.
95 Jacques Maritain, On the Philosophy of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CoMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 16, at 72, 74.

96

McKEON, supra note 81, at 46, 50.
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the Declaration as, on the whole, remarkably well-designed. The flaws
in the human rights enterprise are less in its documentary landmarks
than in the human person-with all our potential for good and evil,
reason and impulse, trust and betrayal, creativity and destruction, selfishness, and cooperation. All too familiar with the defects in human
nature, the framers nevertheless staked their faith, in Article 1, on
"reason and conscience." But they were under no illusions about the
precariousness of that wager.
The Declaration thus seems to me less like the Tower of Babel
than like the sculpture by Arnaldo Pomodoro that dominates the
plaza outside the U.N. building in New York. A gift from the government of Italy, this marvel consists of an enormous sphere of burnished
bronze, perhaps suggesting a globe. The sphere is pleasing to behold,
even though it startles with its imperfection. There are deep, jagged
cracks in its golden-hued surface, cracks too large to ever be repaired.
Perhaps it's cracked because it's flawed (like the broken world), one
thinks. Or maybe (like an egg) it has to break in order for something
else to emerge. Perhaps both. Sure enough, when one peers into the
gashes on its surface, there is another beautiful golden sphere coming
along inside. But that one is already cracked too!
I have no idea what Italy was trying to tell the United Nations!
But whatever is going on inside these spheres, it doesn't seem to be all
chance and accident. There's a tremendous sense of motion, of dynamism, of potency, of emergent probabilities.
Pomodoro's emerging spheres poignantly evoke the great problem of all politics: to what extent can the probabilities be shifted by
reflection and choice, as distinct from the will of the stronger and the
blind forces of history and accident?97 One does not have to be motivated by any love affair with the United Nations to appreciate the importance of a small core of principles to which people of vastly
different backgrounds can appeal. To give up on the existence of
such principles is to give up on the possibility of cross-cultural deliberation about the human future. It is to give up on the common humanity that makes it possible for people of different cultures to
deliberate about how we are to order our lives together in an interdependent world. The framers of the Universal Declaration deserve better, as do the millions of women, men, and children who still lack the
essentials for dignified living.
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APPENDIX:
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

PREAMBLE

WiHmREAs recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal

and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.
WHEREAS disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted
in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind,
and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom
of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.
WHEREAS it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression,
that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.
WHEREAS it is essential to promote the development of friendly
relations between nations.
WHEREAS the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.
WHEREAS Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in
co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
WHEREAS a common understanding of these rights and freedoms
is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge.
Now, Therefore,
The General Assembly
proclaims
THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures,
national and international, to secure their universal and effective rec-
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ognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States
themselves and among the peoples of territories under their
jurisdiction.
ARTICLE 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
ARTICLE 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, nonself-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
ARTICLE

3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of

person.
ARTICLE 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery
and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
ARTICLE 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

ARTICLE 6. Every one has the right to recognition everywhere as a
person before the law.
ARTICLE 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
ARTICLE 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law.
ARTICLE

9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, deten-

tion or exile.
ARTICLE 10. Everyone is entitled to full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against
him.
ARTICLE 11. (1) Everyone charged with a penal offense has the
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in
a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his
defense. (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offense of any
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act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable
at the time the penal offence was committed.
ARTiciE 12.

No one shall be subject to arbitrary interference

with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon
his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.
ARTIc 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the
right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country.
ARTICLE 14. (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in
other countries asylum from persecution. (2) This right may not be
invoked in the case of prosecuiions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
ARTIcLE 15. (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No

one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right
to change his nationality.
ARIcLE 16. (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to
found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage, and at its dissolution. (2) Marriage shall be entered
into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. (3)
The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State.
ARTICLE 17. (1) Everyone has the right own property alone as
well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

ARTIcLE 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, con-

science and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.
ARTICLE 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.
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20. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly and association. (2) No one may be compelled to belong to
an association.
ARTICLE

ARTICLE 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his
country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority
of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
ARTICLE 22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to
social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort
and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
personality.
ARTICLE 23. (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. (3) Everyone who
works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for protection of
his interests.
ARTICLE 24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including
reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with
pay.
ARTICLE 25. (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and childhood
are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born
in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
ARTICLE 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education
shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental states. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional
education shall be made generally available and higher education
shall be equally assessible to all on the basis of merit. (2) Education
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shall be directed to the full development of the human personality
and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further
the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. (3)
Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall
be given to their children.
ARTIcLE 27. (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. (2) Everyone has the right to the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
ARncLE 28. Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can
be fully realized.
ARnCLE 29. (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which
alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. (2)
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. (3)
These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.
ARTICLE 30. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the
rights and freedoms set forth herein.
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